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LIABILITY OF A CREDITOR IN A
CONTROL RELATIONSHIP WITH
ITS DEBTOR
K. THOR LUNDGREN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A creditor who, by virtue of loan agreements or the ac-
quiescence of its debtor, exercises substantial influence and
authority over the business affairs of the debtor risks poten-
tial liability for all the debtor's debts. Most of the leading
cases which illustrate this principle are not widely known or
discussed. Therefore, this article will analyze these cases in
the hope that it will provide creditors and their counsel with
the means to assure recovery of debts without incurring the
inordinate risk that the creditor - in the clear and unerring
perspective of judicial hindsight - will be held liable to
others for improperly exercising such control. The discus-
sion will also assist counsel by isolating factors which courts
have found important in determining whether liability will
be imposed.
Potential liability arising out of a control relationship
transcends the typical institutional lender-borrower loan ar-
rangement. Thus, the term "creditor" includes any person to
whom a debt is owed, whether through a loan of money, sale
of goods or otherwise and who, by virtue of the creditor-
debtor relationship, is in a position to exert control over the
business affairs of a borrower.'
There are a variety of theories under which "control lia-
bility" may arise. First, under the instrumentality or alter
* B.A., University of Michigan, 1969; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1974; part-
ner, Michael, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. For example, loan covenants often grant lenders the right to call a loan upon
changes in management, a merger of the company, a sale of substantial portions of
the business or a decline in net worth or other measures of performance; to appoint
positions on the debtor's board of directors; and to require that the borrower continue
its present business. Moreover, the right to call a loan by virtue of any real or
imagined default (including the elusive "deems itself insecure" clause) vests a consid-
erable amount of control in a lender. See H. PROCHNOW, BANK CREDIT (1981).
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ego rule,2 liability for the obligations of the debtor is im-
posed where a creditor's control over a debtor's business and
financial affairs is so dominant that either the creditor has
become the alter ego of the debtor or the debtor has become
the creditor's "instrument." 3 Second, employing a concep-
tually similar analysis, other courts use agency law princi-
ples to impose liability.4 Still other courts use a third
method: a creditor found to be in a position to exert control
over payments to other creditors may incur liability for the
debtor's failure to pay so-called "trust fund taxes" due the
government.' Fourth, in cases involving companies that
have issued publicly held securities, plaintiffs have sought to
impose liability on creditors by alleging that they were con-
trolling persons within the meaning of section 15 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and section 20 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.6 Fifth, a creditor who endeavors to
assist a debtor in operating its business may find that such
efforts expose the creditor to a negligence claim under the
2. The instrumentality or alter ego rule has long been employed by courts in
imposing liability upon stockholders and parent companies for the obligations of the
corporations they are deemed to control, and also to subordinate the claims of such
persons to other creditors if the company or its stockholders are found to have abused
their position of control for an improper purpose which proximately causes injury to
other creditors. There is a considerable body of decisions and articles which address
such questions in detail and it is not the purpose of this article to again discuss such
issues. To pursue this topic, see 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS §§ 41-45 (rev. penn. ed. 1983); Clark, The Duties of the Corpora-
tion Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1977); Herzog & Zweibel, The
Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83 (1961); Land-
ers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 527 (1976); Landers, .4 Unpied Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate
Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589 (1975); Posner, The Rights of Credi-
tors ofAffiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cmn. L. REv. 499 (1976). See also Comstock v.
Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); In re Mobile Steel
Co., 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Branding Iron Steak House, 536 F.2d 299 (9th
Cir. 1976); In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1968);
In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); In re Ty-
phoon Indus., Inc., 6 Bankr. 886 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Gelatt v. De Dakis, 77 Wis.
2d 578, 254 N.W.2d 171 (1977).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 11-50.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 51-80.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 81-104.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t (1982), respectively. See also infra text accompanying
notes 105-21.
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traditional tort theory of assumption of duty.7 Finally, sec-
tion 547(b)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 while not impos-
ing liability, may extend the reach of the preference period
from ninety days to one year for creditors who are held to be
insiders by virtue of their control over a debtor.9
When a debtor defaults on a loan agreement or when it
owes money to a creditor beyond the agreed payment pe-
riod, concern about repayment often will lead its creditors to
demand drastic concessions as the price of forbearance.
Without another source of financing, the debtor may accede
to a number of creditor demands and grant a right of consul-
tation and veto power over expenditure of funds. The
debtor may also give the creditor significant authority over
decisions such as which creditors will be paid and when pay-
ments will be made, the manner in which the debtor will
conduct its business, whom the debtor will retain and hire,
which assets will be held and which sold, and which con-
tracts will be accepted.' 0
With increasing frequency, lenders and trade creditors
are also given equity in the debtor's company in exchange
for the debt. This accommodation dramatically increases
the ability of creditors to exercise substantial control over
their debtors. With these factors in mind, an examination of
the decisions defining the boundaries of creditor liability
begins.
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A. The Instrumentality or Alter Ego Theory
An early case considering the extent of control necessary
to impose liability on lenders is Harris Trust & Savings Bank
v. Keig (In re Prima Co.)." Certain banks that had lent
Prima Company large sums of money became dissatisfied
with its management when the company was operating un-
7. See infra text accompanying notes 122-31.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 132-40.
10. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modifledandpetionfor reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974). See also J. KUSNET & J. ANTOPOL, MODERN BANKING FoRaNis (1981), for a
compilation of standard forms and agreements.
11. 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939).
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profitably. One of the banks suggested that the debtor em-
ploy an outsider as manager of the company. Soon
thereafter, Prima reluctantly employed the recommended
manager and executed a contract granting him complete
control over the business. His decisions were subject only to
the two lenders' approval. 12 The trial court found the follow-
ing: Prima had reasonable grounds to believe that the banks
would call their loans if the company did not employ the
manager; the banks exercised undue influence and took ad-
vantage of the debtor's situation in order to force the man-
ager and his contract upon it; and the contract resulted in the
elimination of responsibilities of the company's officers. Fi-
nally, the trial court found that under the employment con-
tract, the banks exclusively controlled the business of the
debtor, and the manager, therefore, had become the instru-
ment of the banks. Finding that the banks controlled and
directed the debtor's business through their recommended
manager, the trial court decided that the banks were liable to
the bankruptcy trustee for losses sustained by the debtor
during the time the manager operated the business. 13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
recognized that the debtor acquiesced in the bank's recom-
mendation that a new manager be hired. In support of its
finding, the court found that: the debtor was unable to meet
its financial obligations to the banks, it feared the banks
would call their loans, and the stockholders were concerned
about their personal guarantees. Nevertheless, the court re-
verse, ruling this acquiescence was "not sufficient to consti-
tute domination of [the debtor's] will."' 4 Central to the
court's ruling was the absence of a factual basis demonstrat-
ing that the banks had made any threats to induce the debtor
to enter into the employment contract. Other factors
deemed significant by the court were the lack of evidence to
indicate that the lenders attempted to manipulate the
debtor's business affairs through the manager. 5  The
debtor's failure to complain about the manager's conduct in
12. 98 F.2d at 961-62.
13. Id. at 956, 962-64.
14. Id. at 965.
15. The court opined that the amount of their loans "certainly warranted" their
involvement in the debtor's financial affairs. Id. at 966.
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running the business was also significant. 6 The court also
noted that some time after execution of the original contract,
the debtor and the manager entered into another employ-
ment contract without the lenders' knowledge. 7
Implicit in the Seventh Circuit's ruling is the notion that
pressure perceived by a debtor from its financial predica-
ment which results in a weakening of a debtor's will without
concomitant wrongful or overbearing conduct by a creditor
is insufficient to render a creditor liable for exercising some
managerial control. Additionally, the lack of creditor in-
volvement in the debtor's daily business affairs and the
debtor's apparent independent acquiescence in the man-
ager's recommendations influenced the circuit court's deci-
sion to reverse.
Ford v. CE. Wilson & Co. 18 is another decision which
approved strong measures taken by the creditor to protect
its loan. In Ford, a borrower having an outstanding loan
secured by a chattel mortgage and accounts receivable re-
quested an additional loan from its bank. As a condition of
this loan, the debtor agreed to execute additional security
agreements pledging personal property and accounts receiv-
able and to lease warehouse space to the bank. 19 Addition-
ally, the debtor agreed to deposit all proceeds of its accounts
in a special account. The counter signature of the bank's
agent was required on all checks drawn against this account.
Some time later, the business failed and the bank liquidated
its collateral. A trade creditor brought suit against the bank
for the unpaid purchase price of goods it sold to the debtor;
however, the trial court granted the bank's motion for a di-
rected verdict. On appeal, the trade creditor contended that
the bank was liable for the debtor's contracts because it as-
sumed such control of the debtor's business as to become a
coprincipal or partner.20 Finding for the bank, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the debtor contin-
ued to conduct its own business and that the bank's actions
were necessary to protect the security for repayment of its
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 129 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1942).
19. Id. at 615.
20. Id. at 617.
1984]
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loans. Relying on Prima, the court summarily dismissed the
plaintiff's contention, stating: "What was done here was en-
tirely insufficient to render the Bank a co-principal or
partner." 2'
In Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank,22 the
plaintiff also failed to convince the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit that a lender should be held liable as an alter
ego for the liabilities of a debtor corporation. There the
bank lent a sum of money to the debtor which was secured
by a pledge of all the company's stock. After making an ad-
ditional loan to the company, the bank arranged to have its
assistant cashier elected president of the company in order to
protect its interests as a creditor.23 The cashier was given
one-third of the company's stock by its sole shareholder,
subject to the pledge to the bank, and the evidence showed
that the general manager of the debtor company received his
directions from the cashier. The court recognized that
"when one corporation owns or controls the entire property
of another, and operates its plant and conducts its business
as a department of its own business, or as its alter ego, it is
responsible for its obligations incurred in so doing."'24 How-
ever, the court held that the bank's conduct was the product
of a legitimate and customary practice of a substantial credi-
tor in overseeing the business of a debtor which was in
financial trouble and it did not constitute sufficient control to
render the bank liable for the debts of the company to a
trade creditor.
These decisions should be compared to Credit Managers
Association of Southern Calfornia v. Superior Court.26 There
the plaintiff's 27 complaint alleged that the debtor, Jer Merai
Lingerie Company, was solvent and that its assets had a fair
21. Id.
22. 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916).
23. Id. at 43-44.
24. Id. at 45.
25. Id. at 46.
26. 51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975). In this case the California
Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether the trial court committed reversible
error in ruling that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of
action which would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.
27. The plaintiff was an assignee for the benefit of creditors of a corporation
which had borrowed money from the defendant bank.
Vol. 67:523
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market value of approximately one million dollars when its
promissory note to the Security Pacific National Bank came
due, and that the bank then demanded the debtor employ
Mordy and Company as its business consultant or else the
bank "would foreclose the. . . note and close down"28 the
debtor's operation. It also alleged that Mordy was so em-
ployed over the objection of the debtor, and that Mordy and
the other defendants "implemented or caused to be imple-
mented strict and oppressive credit policies, sales proce-
dures, and inventory policies toward the distributions [sic] of
the products of said corporation." 29 Finally, the complaint
alleged that they acted without regard to the wishes or appp-
roval of the directors and stockholders and were negligent in
the management of the debtor's business. 30 On these allega-
tions, the California Court of Appeal overturned the trial
court, declaring:
Credit Managers' first amended complaint directly or indi-
rectly alleged, in effect, that Jer Merai, against its will, was
compelled by Bank to employ Mordy as business consult-
ant and that it was compelled to surrender to Mordy com-
plete management control of Jer Merai to such an extent
that Mordy was able to overrule and supplant the board of
directors and shareholders in its operation of the business.
Under such circumstances in our view a trial court could
properly conclude that Mordy had the same fiduciary obli-
gation to Jer Merai and its creditors and to the stockhold-
ers of Jer Merai that the officers and directors of Jer Merai
would have had to such creditors and such sharehold-
ers. . . . Directors of a corporation are trustees of the
stockholders and indirectly for the creditors.3'
28. Credit Managers, 51 Cal App. 3d at 355, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 358, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
31. Id. at 359-60, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 247 (citations omitted). Regarding this last
statement, see McGivern v. Amasa Lumber Co., 77 Wis. 2d 241,252, 252 N.W.2d 371,
377 (1977). See also Commons v. Schine, 35 Cal. App. 3d 141, 145, 110 Cal. Rptr.
606, 608 (1973), where the court stated:
One who dominates and controls an insolvent corporation may not, however,
assert the general immunity of creditor preferences from attack. He may not
use his power to secure for himself an advantage over other creditors of the
corporation. The corporate controller-dominator is treated in the same man-
ner as a director of an insolvent corporation and thus occupies a fiduciary
relationship to its creditors.
(Citations omitted.)
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Because the court ruled on the sufficiency of allegations
in the complaint, it could be argued that the court's decision
reflects a modem or more enlightened view of the law, par-
ticularly when the trend to expand liability in "progressive"
jurisdictions, such as California, is considered. However,
this case can be distinguished from those previously dis-
cussed. In Credit Managers it was alleged that the consult-
ant took actions over the objection of the debtor. 2 This
threat of immediate creditor action to foreclose unless a
business consultant was hired appeared to be more direct
than the "threat" in Prima and could have formed the basis
for the opinion. Unfortunately, the court in Credit Manag-
ers did not discuss Prima or other decisions in this area, nor
did it analyze the degree of creditor action or control which
would be considered legally permissible.
Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chemi-
cal Corp. 33 provides an excellent history of the law in this
area and demonstrates the latitude courts grant creditors
who exercise control over their debtor in seeking to protect
repayment of their debt. The plaintiffs were ten creditors of
an insolvent corporation who sued National Distillers to re-
covery money owed them from the debtor, Brad's Machine
Products, Inc. Brad's previously was awarded a contract to
supply fuses to the government. Brass was a principal com-
ponent of the fuses. Bridgeport Brass Company, a subsidi-
ary of National Distillers, was the principal supplier of brass
to Brad's. By March 1969, Brad's owed Bridgeport approxi-
mately one million dollars. At the request of Brad's, Bridge-
port converted this obligation to a promissory note secured
by a real estate mortgage.34 The parties also entered into an
agreement whereby Brad's would continue to receive brass
as long as it paid promptly for new shipments. Notwith-
standing this agreement, by July 1969, Brad's owed another
$600,000 to Bridgeport for its brass purchases. By then the
government had threatened to cancel Brad's contract due to
its deteriorating financial condition. Not surprisingly, a
32. See Credit Managers, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 355, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
33. 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modfied andpetitionfor reh'g denied, 490 F.2d
916 (5th Cir. 1974).
34. 483 F.2d at 1107.
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meeting was called and it was agreed that National Distillers
would provide Brad's with internal financial management
assistance; lend it another $600,000; defer payment on
$630,000 of accounts receivable; assist Brad's in liquidating
unprofitable assets in order to provide working capital; and
intervene with the government Shortly thereafter, Brad's
executed notes for the amounts due and secured them with a
real estate mortgage and a security interest in certain of its
assets. Brad's also assigned other assets to National which
could be sold to increase the liquidity in the working capital
fund. Leon Rudd, an internal auditor employed by Na-
tional, was sent to Brad's plant to oversee its finances and
establish control procedures. 6 Rudd remained with Brad's
for fifteen months and during this time National loaned
Brad's another $169,000 and deferred another $667,000 in
accounts payable. Despite Rudd's efforts and National's lar-
gess, Brad's ceased doing business.37
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit began its
analysis with a discussion of the instrumentality rule cases
where the controlling "creditor" was generally an owner of
the dominated corporation or had formed the corporation to
advance its own interests.3 8 Reviewing the cases, the court
noted that ownership of a dominated company was not the
determinative factor when imposing liability.39 Rather, the
court extracted a broader principle of control liability:
If a lender becomes so involved with its debtor that it is in
fact actively managing the debtor's affairs, then the quan-
tum of control necessary to support liability under the "in-
strumentality" theory may be achieved.
An examination of "instrumentality" cases involving
the creditor-debtor relationships demonstrates that courts
require a strong showing that the creditor assumed actual,
participatory, total control of the debtor. Merely taking an
active part in the management of the debtor corporation
does not automatically constitute control, as used in the in-
strumentality doctrine, by the creditor corporation.40
35. Id. at 1108.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1109.
38. See supra note 2 and cases cited therein.
39. Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1109, 1114.
40. Id. at 1105.
1984]
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Had Krivo ended its analysis at that point, a relatively direct
and understandable principle would have emerged from the
case. Unfortunately, the court may have been overly influ-
enced by the instrumentality cases involving debts between
parent and subsidiary corporations, for it further stated: "In
summary, then, the control required for liability under the
'instrumentality' rule amounts to total domination of the
subservient corporation to the extent that the subservient
corporation manifests no separate corporate interests of its
own and functions solely to achieve the purposes of the
dominant corporation."'" The court further noted the re-
quirement under the instrumentality rule that injury in the
form of injustice or inequitable consequences result from a
misuse of control.42
In applying the law as discerned by it to the case, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court decision that there was
insufficient evidence to establish a jury question on the issue
of control.43 The plaintiffs had contended that Rudd domi-
nated Brad's decision making. The court disagreed. Instead,
it noted that Rudd was not thrust upon the debtor and, al-
though Rudd's signature on all checks was mandatory, he
only voiced his displeasure when expenditures were pro-
posed that were unrelated to Brad's machine shop opera-
41. Id. at 1106. See supra note 2 and cases cited therein for statements of the rule
in virtually identical terms. These cases address the question of controlling stock-
holder and parent corporation liability arising out of their domination of controlled
corporations. The court in Krivo appeared to rely at least in part on a statement in 1
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43 (rev. perm.
ed. 1983) for support. However, section 43 focused on the liability of parent corpora-
tions for obligations of their subsidiaries. Given the ability of one with a substantial
ownership interest to cause a controlled corporation to serve such person's parochial
or selfish interests, it is debatable whether this language from the "ownership" cases
should be included in resolving questions involving liability arising strictly from a
debtor-creditor relationship. This language results in such an onerous burden that it
is reasonable to expect that plaintiffs with an otherwise meritorious case will have
little if any chance of prevailing. The confusion which can result is exemplified by
Lane v. Dickinson State Bank, 605 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), in which the
plaintiff alleged that a bank controlled a debtor corporation to such an extent that the
bank became the alter ego of the debtor. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention,
holding "we have found no authority for applying the alter ego doctrine to a situa-
tion such as this one, where the individuals are not alleged to be shareholders, incor-
porators, directors or officers of the target corporation." Id. at 653.
42. Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1106.
43. Id. at 1114.
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tion.44 Further, Rudd's powers were essentially negative in
character and although Rudd determined which trade credi-
tors would be paid, he shared this responsibility with Brad's
personnel. Finally, although Rudd's powers were considera-
ble, they were limited to overseeing Brad's finances and
neither he nor anyone else had influence over other key ar-
eas of Brad's operations.45 The court concluded that al-
though National Distillers had the capacity to exert great
pressure, this power was inherent in any creditor-debtor re-
lationship; therefore, the existence and exercise of this power
did not constitute sufficient control for purposes of the "in-
strumentality" rule. What was needed in order to establish
liability, but was not shown, was that National Distillers ex-
ercised control in the actual operations of the debtor
corporation.46
While the courts have recognized the potential liability
of a creditor who assumes control of a debtor under the in-
strumentality or alter ego theory, it is apparent from these
cases that courts are extremely reluctant to impose such lia-
bility.47 It appears from the decisions that courts recognize
the practical necessities that arise when creditors are con-
fronted with debtors in financial distress. Moreover, a value
judgment appears to have been made by the courts that it is
worthwhile to permit creditors to take relatively strong
measures, when working with a debtor's business, to protect
the creditor's debt rather than adopt a rule which would
have the effect of forcing creditors to seek premature liqui-
dation or bankruptcy proceedings. To summarize, under the
instrumentality rule courts permit a creditor to place itself in
a position to obtain all necessary information, to request a
negative veto power over a debtor's financial transactions
and to provide assistance or counseling to a debtor.48 There
44. Id. at 1111.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1114.
47. See, for example, supra text accompanying notes 11-25, and 33-46 for a dis-
cussion of cases that did not impose liability.
48. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modofedandpetitionfor reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974); Ford v. C.E. Wilson & Co., 129 F.2d 614 (2nd Cir. 1942); Harris Trust & Say.
Bank v. Keig (In re Prima Co.), 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied 305 U.S. 658
(1939); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916).
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is a stronger likelihood that liability will be imposed under
this rule when a creditor demands and assumes such control
over the entire spectrum of a debtor's business affairs that
existing management is supplanted and is reduced to carry-ing out the directions of the creditor.49 It is, however, diffi-
cult to define the precise point at which liability will attach
in view of the relatively small number of cases that have ap-
plied the instrumentality rule to the debtor-creditor
relationship. 50
B. Liability Arising From Agency
In A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc. ,I Ithe Minne-
sota Supreme Court was receptive to imposing liability upon
a control creditor when the plaintiff asserted a theory of re-
sponsibility predicated on agency law. In that case eighty-
six farmers sought to impose liability on Cargill, Incorpo-
rated, a lender to Warren Grain and Seed Company. War-
ren was the operator of a grain elevator which purchased
from and stored grain for local farmers, and which owed
$2,000,000 to the plaintiffs. 52 Cargill began lending funds to
Warren in 1964 for working capital, its initial loan being
$175,000. Ultimately, when Warren ceased operations in
1977 it was indebted to Cargill for $3,600,000. A real estate
mortgage and a chattel mortgage on Warren's grain inven-
tories secured the loans. In return for the financing, Cargill
was given a right of first refusal to purchase grain from War-
ren. As part of a 1967 agreement to increase funding, Car-
gill was given access to Warren's financial records. Warren
also agreed not to make capital improvements in excess of
$5,000 without Cargill's consent. Additionally, Warren was
prohibited from guaranteeing any debts, encumbering its as-
sets, declaring a dividend, or selling or buying stock without
Cargill's consent.53
49. See, e.g., Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d
352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975).
50. Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resultingfrom Improper Interference
with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 (1975).
51. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
52. Id. at 287-88.
53. Id. at 288.
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Between 1967 and 1973 Cargill made a number of rec-
ommendations to Warren concerning the operation of its
business. However, Warren never implemented the recom-
mendations. As Warren's indebtedness continued to exceed
its line of credit, Cargill kept a daily debit position on War-
ren and a bank account funded by Cargill was available
from which Warren could draw checks. In the spring of
1977, farmers, hearing that Warren's checks were not being
paid, contacted Cargill regarding Warren's status. They
were initially informed there would be no problem with pay-
ment.-4 In April 1977, an audit disclosed that Warren was
$4,000,000 in debt and Cargill learned that Warren's
financial statements had been deliberately falsified. Cargill
refused to provide additional financing and sent an officer to
supervise the grain elevator in its final days of operation.55
Claiming Cargill was a principal of Warren, the plaintiffs
alleged that Cargill was jointly liable for Warren's indebted-
ness to them. A jury found Cargill liable and the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cargill, "by its control
and influence over Warren, became a principal with liability
for the transactions entered into by its agent Warren. ' 56 The
court pointed to several specific factors which demonstrated
Cargill's control over Warren: (1) Cargill's constant recom-
mendations; (2) Cargilrs right of first refusal to buy grain;
(3) Warren's inability to mortgage its property, purchase
stock or pay dividends without Cargill's approval; (4) Car-
gill's right to inspect Warren's premises; (5) Cargill's criti-
cism of Warren's business practices; (6) Cargill's belief that
Warren needed "strong paternal guidance"; (7) Warren's
drafts and forms containing Cargill's name; (8) Cargill's
financing of all Warren's grain purchases and operating ex-
penses; and (9) Cargill's power to discontinue the financing
of Warren.5 7 As one might expect, Cargill argued that these
factors were to be found in the ordinary debtor-creditor rela-
tionship; however, the court responded that even if this as-
54. Id. at 289.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 290.
57. Id. at 291.
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sertion were true these factors must be viewed in the light
surrounding Cargill's aggressive financing.5 8
The court justified its decision by characterizing the rela-
tionship between Cargill and Warren as unique.5 9 However,
in reality the actions taken by Cargill which resulted in lia-
bility were similar to those taken by other creditors who
avoided liability under the instrumentality theory.60 it is
clear the court's decision was heavily influenced by the fol-
lowing statement from the Restatement of Agency:6' "A
creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the
mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a
principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the
debtor in connection with the business."62
In Buck v. Nash-Finch Co. 6 3 the South Dakota Supreme
Court applied this same rule of agency to a similar set of
facts, but reached a different result. The defendant, Nash-
58. Id.
59. Id. at 293.
60. See supra text accompanying note 48.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 (1957).
62. Id. Comment a to section 14 0 offers further guidance as to the circum-
stances under which a creditor in a control position will or will not become responsi-
ble for a debtor's obligations. It provides:
A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business acts of
his debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts does not
thereby become a principal. However, if he takes over management of the
debtor's business either in person or through an agent, and directs what con-
tracts may or may not be made, he becomes a principal, liable as a principal
for the obligations incurred thereafter in the normal course of business by the
debtor who has now become his general agent. The point at which the creditor
becomes a principal is that at which he assumes de facto control over the con-
duct of his debtor, whatever the terms of the formal contract with his debtor
may be.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 comment a (1957). While it may be
assumed that this comment did not undertake to set forth the entire universe of cir-
cumstances under which a control creditor may become a principal, it is interesting to
note that the hypothesized facts in this comment are at variance with many of those in
the Jenson decision. As in the case of comment a, many of Cargill's powers were
negative in character. Also, the debtor did not implement many of Cargill's recom-
mendations and the decision does not set forth facts which demonstrate that Cargill
assumed day-to-day control over the debtor's business affairs. For whatever reason,
the Jenson decision chose not to address the comment to section 14 0. It is difficult to
harmonize the comment with section 14 0. The comment suggests a test for imposing
liability similar to that used in the instrumentality cases, while section 14 0 appears to
envision a broader standard for imposing liability which will be more readily satis-
fied. This apparent dichotomy may account for the result in the Jenson case, notwith-
standing the differences between the facts in Jenson and the example in comment a.
63. 102 N.W.2d 84 (S.D. 1960).
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Finch Company, was a wholesaler of grocery merchandise.
Through a wholly-owned subsidiary, it provided secured
financing for a Piggly Wiggly supermarket and thereafter
sold merchandise to it. Nash provided merchandising and
accounting services to Piggly Wiggly. At Nash's insistence,
Piggly Wiggly agreed that a Nash accountant would visit the
market twice a week, make up the payroll, compile weekly
operating reports and financial statements and be a required
co-signer of all checks.6 Nash kept in constant contact with
the operations and financial condition of the market and
made suggestions regarding market operations. Later, at
Nash's suggestion, the supermarket's owner hired a store
manager. At trial the owner testified it was his understand-ing that he had to "get along" with the new manager or
Nash would foreclose its liens.65 Nash discouraged Piggly
Wiggly from buying goods from other vendors which were
available from Nash.66 Apparently, the supermarket failed
and it was ultimately sold to another company in which
Nash held a controlling interest.
Alleging Nash was the undisclosed principal of the su-
permarket, trade creditors who were not paid filed suit
against Nash for the money due them.67 The trial court
ruled that Nash assumed such control of the market that it
was liable as a principal for all merchandise purchased from
the plaintiffs.68 On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme
Court "experienced no difficulty in discovering a basis in the
evidence warranting a finding of an assumption of control
by Nash-Finch Company, and a yielding of and acting
under such control by [the market] in certain phases of his
business." 69 However, the court reversed the trial court be-
cause it found no evidence in the record indicating that Nash
controlled the market's buying operations.7 °
It is difficult, if not impossible, to harmonize the results
in the Jenson and Buck cases. Unlike other control cases,
64. Id. at 85.
65. Id. at 86.
66. Id. at 87.
67. Id. at 84.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 89-90.
70. Id. at 91.
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the court focused on one element of the parties' relationship,
albeit an important one, the buying operations. However, it
failed to examine the entire relationship between the par-
ties.7 1 Such a narrow perspective prevents truly injured
creditors from recovering in meritorious cases. Moreover,
the court apparently ignored the fact that Nash controlled
the payment to suppliers, a more significant form of control
than the type of merchandise to be purchased. Considering
that a Nash-controlled company ultimately purchased the
supermarket, it is questionable whether the court's narrow
focus on control of purchasing activities resulted in a just
application of the rule.
Would the plaintiffs in the instrumentality cases have
fared better under the Restatement rule? Initially, Section
14 0 of the Restatement of Agency 72 appears to be a potent
weapon of which creditor's counsel should be aware. The
central question is whether the term "control" in the Restate-
ment will be construed to require the same elements of con-
trol exercised in the same degree as the instrumentality
cases. If not, two different rules of liability will exist. It is
questionable whether two different rules aimed at accom-
plishing the same result make sense and provide certainty in
the prediction of results. On the other hand, with its history
rooted in the parent corporation and shareholder control
cases, the instrumentality rule may be too restrictive to af-
ford injured parties relief. Perhaps, in order to provide nec-
essary protection for other creditors where a position of
control has been wrongfully abused, it is worthwhile to
maintain a distinction between the seemingly broader lan-
guage of the Restatement, as applied in the Jenson 73 decision,
and the instrumentality rule.
For counsel seeking guidance as to the extent of action
their clients may take to protect themselves without becom-
ing liable for an improper exercise of control, the instrumen-
tality and agency cases suggest certain specific types of
71. See id.
72. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Other decisions which did not
discuss section 14 0, but which have addressed the question of creditor liability under
agency principles, are Commercial Credit v. L.A. Benson Co., 170 Md. 270, 184 A.
236 (1936) and Kelly v. Tracy & Avery Co., 73 N.E. 455 (Ohio 1905).
73. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
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permissible and impermissible actions. Creditors may:
monitor a debtor's business and financial affairs and insist
on detailed information;74 obtain a veto power over pro-
posed financial activities; 75 provide counseling or advice
with respect to discrete business matters;76 and recommend
consultants.77 Creditors may not: obtain a veto over all pro-
posed business activity;78 coerce the debtor into granting a
third party the right to operate the business to the exclusion
of officers and employess; 79 provide assurances of payment
to other creditors unless they are prepared to make such pay-
ments; 80 or become involved in the debtor's business affairs
in such a manner that creates confusion among others as to
which party is actually responsible for the debtor's business
affairs. A bright line for creditors might be this: If a creditor
is at the point where it believes it is necessary to participate
in most facets of business affairs on a recurring basis and to
direct such affairs to the exclusion of the debtor's officers or
employees, the creditor should call the debt and begin pro-
ceedings to liquidate or sell the business.
74. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modfied andpetidonfor reh"g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974). See also supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
75. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modfledandpetiionfor reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974). But see A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn.
1981). See also supra text accompanying note 57.
76. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modfled andpetllionfor reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Keig (In re Prima Co.), 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939); Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's
Bank, 234 F. 41 (8th Cir. 1916). As to potential liability for rendering advice in a
negligence context, see infra section II E.
77. See, for examples, authorities cited supra note 76.
78. See, e.g., Credit Managers Assoc. of S.Cal. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d
552, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975). See also supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
79. See, for example, Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modfled andpetitionfor reh ' denied, 490 F.2d
916 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the defendant escaped liability when the court held that
the third party did not control the company to the exclusion of others. See also supra
text accompanying notes 43-46.
80. See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn.
1981). See supra text accompanying note 54.
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C Liability Under Federal Tax Laws
When the creditor uses its control over a troubled debtor
to protect itself, other traps lie waiting to be sprung in the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 667281 of the Code provides
that any person 82 required to collect, truthfully account for,
and pay over the so-called trust fund taxes imposed by sec-
tion 7501 (for example, income tax, social security and rail-
road retirement taxes withheld from wages) and who
willfully fails to collect, account for or pay such taxes is lia-
ble for the full amount of the taxes not so collected, ac-
counted for or paid.
The dilemma confronting creditors in this area is best
demonstrated by two decisions which arose in the Fifth Cir-
81. 26 I.R.C. § 6672 (1954). Hereinafter citations to the Internal Revenue Code
are only by section number. Section 6672 provides:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully ac-
count for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade
or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penal-
ties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax
evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall
be imposed under section 6653 for any offense to which this section is
applicable.
For other relevant sections dealing with withholding taxes see I.R.C. §§ 7501, 3101,
3202, 3402-3403.
82. As defined in I.R.C. § 6671, the term person "includes an officer or employee
of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer,
employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the viola-
tion occurs." (emphasis added.) The courts have not hesitated to define the term
"person" expansively and, taking note of the word "includes," have refused to limit
the term person to those with a formal position or connection with the taxpayer.
IT1he definition of "persons" does not require that they be formally vested
with the office or employed in the position normally charged with this func-
tion; the definition simply "includes" such persons. Indeed, the language itself
does not require that they be officers or employees of the corporation at all, so
long as they are in fact responsible for controlling corporate disburse-
ments. . . . [I]t is evident from the face of the section that it was designed to
cut through the shield of organizational form and impose liability upon those
actually responsible for an employer's failure to withhold and pay over the tax.
Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 30-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 937 (1970). See also Commonwealth Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. United States, 665
F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Graham, 309 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962);
Walker v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9370 (W.D. Okla. 1968); Dallas
v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9290 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
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cuit.83 In United States v. Hil 84 a contractor borrowed funds
from a bank, securing the loan with an assignment of pro-
gress payments. In January 1962, the contractor informed
the bank that it had a $400,000 deficit but was somewhat
short of cash, having $53.82 in its checking account. Need-
less to say, the bank acted with dispatch. As of January 18,
1962, the bank was granted the right to approve all checks
over $500. The result was that the bank refused to honor
certain checks.8 5 In February the bank allowed certain pro-
gress payments, in which it had a security interest, to be used
to pay essential bills. At all times the bank knew its bor-
rower had withheld income and social security taxes but had
not paid such taxes to the government8 6 On February 18,
1962, the contractor's bonding company made a loan to the
contractor and obtained the right to approve all checks
drawn by the contractor. The bonding company refused to
permit the contractor to pay withholding taxes for the fourth
quarter of 1961. Following the contractor's demise, the gov-
ernment sued the bank and others for unpaid withholding
taxes, alleging the bank was a responsible person within the
meaning of section 6672.87 Following a jury verdict for the
government, the trial court entered judgment n.o.v. for the
bank. The United States appealed. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government's
contention that the bank was liable: "That the Bank allowed
the company to retain and use some of the funds belonging
to it cannot be transposed into an assumption of tax liability
by the Bank.' 88 Although the undisputed record showed the
bank possessed a right to approve checks and that the bank
instructed the company that progress payments could not be
used to pay taxes, the court found that the bank's exercise of
a veto power over corporate checks in order to keep the com-
83. The decisions are: Commonwealth Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. United States, 665
F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Hill, 368 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1966).
84. 368 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1966).
85. Id. at 620.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 619-20.
88. Id. at 623.
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pany alive was insufficient to bring it within the statute's pe-
nal provisions.8 9
The Hill decision should be contrasted with the 1982
Commonwealth National Bank of Dallas v. United States de-
cision.90 There the bank lent money to a corporation and in
return obtained a lock-box arrangement for receivables.
The bank permitted overdrafts on the debtor's checking ac-
count and honored all payroll checks, but did not honor
checks drawn to pay withholding taxes.91 Although the pres-
ident of the debtor corporation directed the bank not to
honor checks drawn to pay withholding taxes, the bank par-
ticipated in the decisions concerning which other creditors
would be paid. All funds coming into the bank were either
used to pay honored checks or to pay back the bank's loan.
The court held the bank liable for the amount of unpaid
withholding taxes, since the bank assumed control over how
the employer's funds were to be spent and which of the cred-
itors were to be paid.92
In both Hill and Commonwealth Bank the creditors exer-
cised control over their debtors' funds and made decisions
and issued directions as to which obligations would be paid.
Thus, it would seem the legal consequences should be identi-
cal. The creditor is left wondering how to navigate in these
waters with conflicting directions.
A review of other decisions in this area provides some
guidance as to the type of control which creditors should
avoid. In First American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States93
a federal district court imposed liability on a bank for un-
paid withholding taxes where a bank officer approved all
corporate checks, the bank knew withholding taxes were
89. Id.
90. 665 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 746.
92. The court stated:
We emphasize that the fact that a bank makes loans (either directly or in the
form of overdrafts) to a corporate employer that is failing to pay over withheld
federal employment taxes to the United States will not, without more, subject
the bank to § 6672 liability. What will subject the bank to liability for those
taxes is the assumption of control over how the employer's funds are to be
spent and over the process of deciding which creditors of the employer are to
be paid and which are not, and when.
Id. at 757.
93. 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9205 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
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due, the bank permitted payments to selected creditors and
itself, and the bank advised the debtor not to pay such taxes.
In United States v. North Side Deposit Bank 94 a bank again
was liable for payment of trust fund taxes where the bank
was the recipient of all its debtor's receivables, the bank be-
gan selectively honoring and dishonoring checks and the
bank knew the debtor could no longer pay its taxes. A more
modest exercise of control over a debtor still rendered a
creditor liable for withheld taxes in Goebert v. United
States, 95 in which an officer of a creditor had himself in-
stalled as an officer of the debtor corporation with complete
authority to sign checks. He caused the debtor to use its
funds to pay loans to the creditor. Although he testified that
he did not know withholding taxes were due, the court was
not convinced.96 The court in Werner v. United States97 best
summarizes the judicial attitude:
The Court does not feel that § 6672 was intended to reach
one who as a bona fide creditor, and not as the power be-
hind a puppet corporation, importunes a failing corpora-
tion to pay off its debts. Obviously creditors can and do
wield considerable power over an ailing business through
the threat of draconian collection measures, but so long as
creditors limit such pressure tactics to inducing payment of
what is owed them, and do not seek to take effective con-
trol of the debtor in order to improve the debtor's ability to
pay, then the mere fact of an obligation owed to the credi-
tor and the creditor's forceful demand for payment, to-
gether with the creditor's capacity through threat of
collection to make the debtor dance to his tune, ought not
to render the creditor a person responsible for the debtor's
payment of taxes within the meaning of § 6672. Only he
who actually calls the tune should be held accountable to
the piper.98
As tempting as it may seem, a lender who begins exercis-
ing control over a debtor's finances and decisions as to which
94. 83-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9503 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
95. 412 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
96. Id. at 361.
97. 374 F. Supp. 558 (D. Conn. 1974), aftd, 512 F.2d 1381 (2d Cir. 1975).
98. 374 F. Supp. at 563.
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obligations will be selectively paid assumes a substantial risk
of an unwanted appointment with the tax collector.99
Another trap for the unwary is contained in section
3505(a) and (b) which provides that: (a) if a lender pays
wages directly to employees or their agent, the lender is lia-
ble for all taxes required to be withheld by their employer
plus interest; and (b) if a lender provides funds to an em-
ployer for the specific purpose of paying wages with actual
notice or knowledge that the employer does not intend to or
will not be able to pay withheld taxes, the lender is liable for
any of such unpaid taxes plus interest in an amount not to
exceed twenty-five percent of the funds lent for such
purpose.'0 °
99. For other decisions on this issue, see Adams v. United States, 504 F.2d 73, 76
(7th Cir. 1974) ("§ 6672 is broad enough to reach an entity which assumes the func-
tion of determining whether or not the employer will pay over taxes withheld from its
employees."); Key v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9249 (S.D. Ind.
1982); Silberberg v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Girard Trust
Corn Exch. Bank v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Melillo v.
United States, 244 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Slodov v. United States,
436 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1978) (United States Supreme Court held that a person who
assumes control over a taxpayer is not liable under section 6672 when at the time he
assumes control there are no funds with which to satisfy preexisting trust fund tax
obligations, even though the taxpayer later generates income).
100. The full text of I.R.C. § 3505 provides:
(a) Direct payment by third parties.-For purposes of sections 3102, 3203,
3402, and 3403, if a lender, surety, or other person, who is not an employer
under such sections with respect to an employee or group of employees, pays
wages directly to such an employee or group of employees, employed by one
or more employers, or to an agent on behalf of such employee or employees,
such lender, surety, or other person shall be liable in his own person and estate
to the United States in a sum equal to the taxes (together with interest) re-
quired to be deducted and withheld from such wages by such employer.
(b) Personal liability where funds are supplied.-If a lender, surety, or
other person supplies funds to or for the account of an employer for the spe-
cific purpose of paying wages of the employees of such employer, with actual
notice or knowledge (within the meaning of section 6323(i)(1)) that such em-
ployer does not intend to or will not be able to make timely payment or deposit
of the amounts of tax required by this subtitle to be deducted and withheld by
such employer from such wages, such lender, surety, or other person shall be
liable in his own person and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the
taxes (together with interest) which are not paid over to the United States by
such employer with respect to such wages. However, the liability of such
lender, surety, or other person shall be limited to an amount equal to 25 per-
cent of the amount so supplied to or for the account of such employer for such
purpose.
(c) Effect of payment.-Any amounts paid to the United States pursuant to
this section shall be credited against the liability of the employer.
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While creditors should be aware of section 3505(a), the
application of its provisions is straightforward and does not
require further discussion.10' However, the section 3505(b)
language "with actual notice . . . that such employer...
will not be able to make timely payment. . ." is susceptible
to varying interpretations. The net cast by this provision was
demonstrated in Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. United States,"0 2
where a lender agreed to help keep a struggling borrower
afloat by permitting overdrafts on its account. As part of
this process the bank honored overdraft checks that were
drawn to pay the debtor's payroll. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit viewed each overdraft check honored as a
separate loan and held the bank liable under section 3505(b),
finding: "Thus, every time the bank supplied funds for pay-
ment of wages it had to know it would be requested to sup-
ply the funds for paying the withholding taxes. This, we
believe, fits well within the situations envisioned for applica-
tion of section 3505(b)."' 10 3 The court noted that the evi-
dence did not show that the bank decided which creditors
were to be paid or that the bank initiated payment decisions.
While the evidence was insufficient to hold the bank liable
under § 6672, the court held it was sufficient to establish lia-
bility under § 3505(b) because a lesser showing of lender
control than that required under § 6672 is sufficient to im-
pose liability.1t 4
It is arguable that the sweep of § 3505(b), particularly as
applied in the Fidelity Bank decision, runs too far afield in
view of the need to encourage lenders and others to assist
struggling business enterprises. Nevertheless, a wise creditor
will always insist that, as a condition of advancing funds,
101. See, e.g., United States v. Towne Realty, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Wis.
1983).
102. 616 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 1185.
104. Id. at 1185-86. See United States v. Swindell-Dressler Co., 79-2 U.S Tax
Cas. (CCH) (W.D. Pa. 1979), where a creditor was held liable under section 3505(b)
when it made periodic payments to a debtor's bank account, co-signed all checks
including payroll checks but refused to sign checks presented to pay withholding
taxes on the grounds that the debtor should attempt to generate internal cash to pay
such obligations. See also Treas. Reg. § 31.3505-1(b)(3) (1976) for the Internal Reve-
nue Service interpretation of when an ordinary working capital loan will or will not
result in liability under section 3505(b).
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records be submitted which indicate that withholding taxes
have been paid. It will also take necessary measures to con-
firm that such taxes will be paid in the future.
D. Attempts to Impose Liability Under the Securities Laws
Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933105 and Section
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934106 impose liabil-
ity upon persons who control others found guilty of violating
such Acts unless, in the case of Section 15, the controlling
person "had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to be-
lieve in the existence of' a violation, and, in the case of Sec-
tion 20(a), the controlling person "acted in good faith and
did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constitut-
ing the violation."
In Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc. 107 disgruntled pur-
chasers of property sought to impose liability under section
20(a) on Diversified Mortgage Investors (DMI), the lender
who financed the developer's operations. Affidavits support-
ing the lender's motion for summary judgment showed that
the lender received financial statements and sales reports,
and periodically inspected the property, but did not have
any right to exercise control or participate in the lot sales
activities. 08 The court granted summary judgment because
"nothing submitted by plaintiffs indicates that fraudulent ac-
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982) provides:
Liability of Controlling Persons. (a) Every person who, by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an
agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or through
stock ownership, agency or otherwise, controls any person liable under sec-
tions 77k or 771, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable
ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability
of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982) provides: Liability of Controlling Persons. (a) Joint
and several liability; good faith defense. Every person who, directly or indirectly, con-
trols any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless
the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
107. 448 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
108. Id. at 989.
[Vol. 67:523
CREDITOR LIABILITY
tivities were taking place. DMI therefore cannot be held lia-
ble as a controlling person."' 0 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Ayers v.
Wolfinbarger l0 also dismissed an attempt to impose such li-
ability upon creditors absent a showing of any facts other
than an extension of credit. In this case, stock was sold. As
security for the balance of the purchase price, additional
stock was pledged to the sellers. Subsequently, the purchas-
ers caused the corporation to issue additional stock to the
plaintiffs in an allegedly fraudulent transaction."' The
plaintiffs brought suit and alleged, inter alia, that the seller-
pledgees were liable for the purchaser's fraudulent acts
under section 15 as controlling persons. The court, however,
was unwilling to extend liability where the stock was pledg-
ed simply as security for the deferred payments.' 12
The plaintiffs in Miller v. Woodmoor Corp. 113 were more
successful in withstanding the motion to dismiss filed by
Westinghouse Credit Corporation, the lender that financed a
real estate development. The plaintiffs, purchasers of unim-
proved real estate, charged that Westinghouse exercised con-
trol over both the sales and development aspects of the
developer's scheme which involved fraudulent misrepresen-
tations and omissions of fact. The court refused to dismiss
the complaint which alleged violations by Westinghouse of
section 15 and section 20(a) because "the allegation that
Westinghouse wielded extensive authority over the affairs of
the enterprise is sufficient to state a cause of action." 14
In In re Falstaff Brewing Antitrust Litigation' 5 the pur-
chaser of a substantial portion of Falstaff's stock sued the
109. Id. at 990.
110. 491 F.2d 8 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 493 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1974).
111. 491 F.2d at 10.
112. Id. at 15. The court stated:
The plaintiffs urge that, because of the default provisions contained in the es-
crow agreement, continued control was vested in the sellers. Bearing in mind
that the plaintiffs had the burden of establishing control, we summarily dismiss
this argument as without merit. We are unwilling to extend the definition of
controlling person to a situation where as here, stock is simply pledged as se-
curity for deferred payments ....
Id. (citations omitted).
113. [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,109 (D. Colo.
1976).
114. Id. at 91,999.
115. 441 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
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company's lenders. As part of his complaint, he alleged that
the lenders were liable under section 15 and section 20(a) for
a number of securities law violations. 1 6 The plaintiff al-
leged that the lenders became involved in the day-to-day op-
erations of Falstaff due to their concerns regarding its
financial condition. He further alleged that the lenders re-
quired Falstaff to replace officers and directors, implement
certain policies, revise its debt structure, obtain an equity in-
vestor, give additional security to the lenders, and obtain
their approval before buying or selling assets." 17 It was al-
leged the lenders gained this control by threatening to de-
clare a default and accelerate their loans." 8
Ruling on the lenders' motions to dismiss the complaint,
the court agreed with plaintiff that, by its terms, section 20(a)
could apply to a lender who assumed a controlling influence
and held that the control exercised by the lenders and the
requisite scienter were sufficiently alleged under section
20(a) to withstand a motion to dismiss. 19
While the number of cases that have considered the spe-
cific issue of creditor liability as a controlling person under
the Securities Acts are relatively few in number, 120 one again
116. Id. at 65.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 68. The court reasoned:
The allegation that the lender defendants controlled the daily affairs of Fal-
staff, although possibly difficult to prove, is surely sufficient under § 20(a). The
court reaches this conclusion in spite of its doubts that the lenders' efforts to
secure their loans through various commercially acceptable methods would
make them controlling persons. A scienter requirement, possibly co-extensive
with that set out in Ernst & Ernst, supra, is certainly required. However, it too
is sufficiently alleged.
Id.
120. Plaintiffs have also sought to hold creditors liable under other theories, such
as aiding and abetting, which transcend the control issue with which this article is
concerned. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d
1307 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); United States Steel & Carnegie
Pension Fund, Inc. v. Orenstein, 557 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1977); Woodward v. Metro
Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v.
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 507 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Clark v. Cameron-
Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Marrero v. Banco Di Roma, 487 F. Supp.
568 (E.D. La. 1980); Tucker v. Janota, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,701 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975); Ferland v. Orange Groves of
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sees the potential for liability when creditors become in-
volved in the day-to-day affairs of a borrower in order to
protect their loans. Although the Falstaff court appeared to
appreciate the dilemma confronting the lenders, it refused to
dismiss the complaint, thus ensuring substantial costs to de-
fend the litigation at least through discovery and perhaps
through trial. The cases provide one easy answer - simply
lending money is insufficient to result in liability as a con-
trolling person.' 2' The tough question - how far can a
creditor go in taking action to protect its debt - remains
unanswered. Analogizing to the instrumentality and agency
cases, exercising modest veto power over limited financial
debtor actions, obtaining necessary financial information,
and making limited suggestions about business practices
would not render a creditor a control person. If such were
not the case, long recognized and well established lending
practices could result in vast liability under the Securities
Acts. It is unlikely that Congress intended such a result.
E. Liability Predicated on Tort Theories
Frequently, in order to protect its interests, a creditor
comes to the aid of a struggling debtor and provides a vari-
ety of services to assist the operation of the debtor's business,
such as managing payables and receivables, providing tech-
nical expertise in manufacturing processes or offering gui-
dance on the retention and dismissal of personnel. The list
can be as extensive as there are distressed debtors. Some-
times, as shown in the instrumentality and agency cases,
such assistance takes the form of providing consultants and
managers.12 2 What happens if, notwithstanding altruistic in-
tentions, the efforts are for naught or exacerbate the matter
and the business fails? Can such creditor efforts result in lia-
bility to the business owner or others under tort theories?
Fla., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp.
1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101
(D. Del. 1974).
121. See, e.g., Ayers v. Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 493 F.2d
1405 (5th Cir. 1974); Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448 F.Supp 983 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 48 & 76-77.
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In certain circumstances the courts will impose liability
using the traditional tort theory of assumption of duty. In re
Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation2 3 concerned
the collapse of the twentieth largest bank in the United
States. Following a suit by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) against various insurers on bankers
blanket bonds, the insurers began third party actions against
the FDIC. The complaints alleged that the government cor-
poration exceeded its traditional regulatory role and "'vol-
untarily undertook to issue orders and directives and make
recommendations and suggestions' 1124 with respect to the
operation of the bank's business and that it was reasonable
for the bank and its directors, officers and shareholders to
rely on the government to protect them.1 25 In essence, they
alleged the government became a volunteer assisting and
participating in the bank's business and thereby assumed a
duty to act with the requisite care. In denying the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a
claim, the court stated that if the government assumed con-
trol, as alleged by the plaintiffs, it could not negligently oper-
ate the business without escaping liability. 26 The court's
ruling takes on added significance because the court permit-
ted the third party plaintiffs to overcome the obstacles con-
tained in the Federal Tort Claims Act.127
Perhaps surprising to some, the court's decision is consis-
tent with concepts of negligence law. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts provides that one who undertakes to assist
another is liable for the resulting harm where that person's
conduct either increases the risk of harm or the harm arises
123. 445 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
124. Id. at 728 (quoting from a memorandum of two third-party plaintiffs).
125. 445 F. Supp. at 728.
126. [W]e think that if the Government goes beyond the normal regulatory
activities and substitutes its decisions for those of the officers and directors, and
if the bank and bank directors reasonably rely on these actions of the Govern-
ment, the Government may assume a duty to those parties to prevent fraud. .
• .[O]nce having taken control of a bank, as it is alleged to have done here, it
could not operate it in a negligent manner without being subject to liability.
Id. at 733-35. Compare Harmsen v. Smith, 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1978), with First
State Bank of Hudson County v. United States, 599 F.2d 558 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 101 (1980).
127. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
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from reliance on the conduct of the person who assumed the
responsibilities. 28 In view of such authorities, when a credi-
tor provides specific assistance to a debtor or assumes con-
trol over a debtor's operations, whether directly or by
suggesting a third person, and a debtor relies on the creditor,
the creditor may risk being held liable for failing to perform
such assumed duties with reasonable care. However, a
number of questions arise. What is the scope of the duty?
Recognizing the social efficacy of bona fide creditor efforts to
assist a struggling business, will the courts adopt an excep-
tion to the rule or attempt to maintain an incentive for credi-
tors to provide such assistance by adopting a gross
negligence or recklessness test? Should courts do so? How
will performance of the duty be measured? Presumably,
under the doctrine of contributory negligence, the debtor
will be required to object to or not carry out actions which
he believes are improper. Will courts stretch the concept of
foreseeability to third parties such as other creditors? These
and a multitude of other questions are raised by application
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). The section provides in
full:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertak-
ing, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
Id. While the term "physical harm" is used in the text of section 323, comment d to
the section would indicate that the section applies to other types of injury such as
economic loss. Moreover, the annotations to section 323 demonstrate the courts have
applied the assumption of duty rule to cases involving economic injury. See, e.g.,
Schwartz v. Greenfied, Stein and Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582
(1977); McDonald v. Title Ins. Co. of Ore., 49 Or. App. 1055, 621 P.2d 654 (1980). A
similar synopsis of the law is contained in 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 4(4) (1966):
One who undertakes to do an act or perform a service for another has the duty
to exercise care, and is liable for injury resulting from his failure to do so, even
though his undertaking was a purely voluntary undertaking or even though it
was completely gratuitous, and he was not under any obligation to do such act
or perform such service, or there was no consideration for the promise or un-
dertaking sufficient to support an action ex contractu based thereon.
(Citations omitted.) It is interesting to note that the complaint in Credit Managers
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975), contained a
count alleging that the lenders acted negligently in managing the debtor.
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of the assumption of duty rule in the Franklin National case.
Such questions have traditionally posed a problem in this
area of the law. As Professor Prosser noted, "[j]ust when the
duty is undertaken, when it ends and what conduct is re-
quired, are nowhere clearly defined, and perhaps cannot
be."1
29
The use of tort law theories to expand the liabilities of
lenders who choose to exercise substantial control over their
debtors was demonstrated by the recent jury verdict in State
National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 130 In
Farah the plaintiff-debtor alleged that its lenders used a
change in the management control clause in their loan
agreement with Farah to engage in fraud and duress and to
improperly interfere with Farah's business. A variety of im-
proper and selfish interests were ascribed to the lenders.
Following a jury trial, a verdict in excess of eighteen million
dollars was awarded to Farah.
Given the possibility of extensive liability for negligently
assisting in a debtor's business, creditors would be well ad-
vised to carefully consider taking any such proposed action,
or proffering others such as consultants.' 31
F The "Insider" Status of Creditors Under the
Bankruptcy Code
While it does not impose substantive liability, section
547(b)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code132 extends the period
during which preferential transfers of property to a creditor
may be recovered from ninety days to one year prior to the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, if the creditor is an
"insider" and had reasonable grounds to believe the debtor
129. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 344 (4th ed. 1971).
130. Case No. 08-82-00160-CV (on appeal Tex. Civ. App.). The case has been
appealed and oral arguments were heard in December, 1983. In view of the issues
and amount involved, counsel for lenders will wish to monitor the progress of this
case.
13 1. The extent to which an indemnification and hold harmless agreement, with
appropriate recitals, may be effective in limiting a creditor's liability is beyond the
scope of this article. Anyone about to become substantially involved in assisting a
debtor should give consideration to obtaining such an agreement.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982). For an in depth consideration of the defini-
tion and treatment of insiders see Note, The Term Insider Within Section 547 (b)(4)(B)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 726 (1982).
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was insolvent at the time of transfer. 133 In the case of corpo-
rations, "insider"'134 is defined as including, among others, di-
133. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid
any transfer of property of the debtor -
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor,
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made -
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of filing of the peti-
tion, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer -
(i) was an insider, and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the
time of such transfer, and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if -
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent pro-
vided by the provisions of this title.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) provides:
(25) "insider" includes -
(A) if the debtor is an individual -
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor,
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner,
(iii) general partner of the debtor, or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person
in control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation -
(i) director of the debtor,
(ii) officer of the debtor,
(iii) person in control of the debtor,
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner,
(v) general partner of the debtor, or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in con-
trol of the debtor,
(C) if the debtor is a partnership - (i) general partner of the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in
control of the debtor,
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner,
(iv) general partner of the debtor, or
(v) person in control of the debtor,
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or rela-
tive of an elected official of the debtor,
(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor,
and
(F) managing agent of the debtor.
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rectors, officers, persons "in control" of the corporation and
,,affiliates." 135
Thus, the question arises under what circumstances will a
creditor be deemed "in control" of its debtor, thereby en-
abling a debtor in reorganization or a trustee to recover
otherwise preferential payments made beyond the ninety
day period and up to one year prior to commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings. To date the courts have refused to
rule that a creditor is in control of a debtor simply by virtue
of a credit relationship. Thus, in In re Jefferson Mortgage
Co. 136 the court rejected a trustee's contention that a creditor
was an insider of a debtor by virtue of a lending relation-
ship, where the control exercised was merely incidental to
the creditor-debtor relationship. 37 This decision is consis-
135. 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) defines affiliate as:
(A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to
vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor,
other than an entity that holds such securities -
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to
vote such securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact exercised such
power to vote;
(B) corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities
are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to
vote, by the debtor, or by an entity that directly or indirectly owns,
controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that
holds such securities -
(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary
power to vote such securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact exercised
such power to vote;
(C) person whose business is operated under a lease or operating
agreement by a debtor, or person substantially all of whose prop-
erty is operated under an operating agreement with the debtor; or
(D) entity that operates the business or all or substantially all of the
property of the debtor under a lease or operating agreement;
136. 25 Bankr. 963 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982).
137. The Trustee has not cited any cases, nor can this court find any, in which
a creditor was held to be an "insider" for purposes of section 547 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code merely by reason of being a creditor. Perhaps § 101(25)(B)(iii)
might apply if the creditor was a "person in control of the debtor," but that
fact has not been established in this case. . . . The Bank may have exercised
some measure of control over the debtor financially in order to protect its col-
lateral. However, this control was merely incident to their creditor-debtor rela-
tlionshop. The creditor had only financial power over the debtor, and the
debtor could have terminated the relationships at any time and looked for an-
other creditor.
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tent with the intent of the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code. 138
The court in In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc. 139
took a more restrictive view of persons deemed in control of
a corporation: "The persons who might be expected to con-
trol a corporate debtor are its officers, directors and substan-
tial stockholders. Thus, aside from officers and directors, a
person is an insider if that person meets the test of an 'affili-
ate . . . "140
The more difficult question is the extent to which a credi-
tor may act and insist upon cooperation without the risk of
being held to be "in control" of its debtor. A strong case
can be made for permitting creditors to take actions such as
providing financial guidance, exercising specific veto powers
over the expenditure of funds, insisting upon full disclosure
of information and providing limited assistance, without as-
suming the risk of being deemed in control. These al-
lowances would encourage creditors to provide needed
assistance to troubled debtors. Only when a creditor's role is
transformed from one of taking a commercially prudent ac-
tion to safeguard a loan to one of assuming substantial and
detailed authority over all facets of a debtor's business
would a finding of control be appropriate and consistent
with the goal of encouraging creditors to assist their debtors
in periods of financial distress.
Id. at 970 (emphasis added). Accord In re Taylor, 29 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1983). See also McWilliams v. Gordon (In re Camp Rockhill, Inc.), 12 Bankr. 829
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
138. "'An insider is one who has a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor
that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arms length
with the debtor."' Loftis v. Minar (In re Montanino), 15 Bankr. 307, 310 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1981) (quoting analysis of H.R. 8200, H. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
312 (1977); analysis of S. 2266, S. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 25 (1978), reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5787, 5810).
139. 22 Bankr. 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
140. Id. at 430. The court further stated: "[A] corporate debtor may be influ-
enced by the demands of its major customers or creditors but such influence alone
does not constitute the requisite voting control contemplated under Code § 101(25)(B)
for purposes of defining a person in control of a corporate debtor who might be re-
garded as an 'insider."' Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
There are a variety of theories under which a creditor
may become liable to other creditors or its debtor for assum-
ing what is found to be inordinate control or an improper
exercise of control over a debtor's business affairs. Perhaps
more than most creditors realize, there are a number of pit-
falls awaiting those who act imprudently, even though their
status may confer a superior position.' 41
Regardless of the theory, common elements thread
through all the cases. Courts recognize that at times it is im-
perative for creditors to take strong measures to protect their
interests. 142 The courts will sanction specific actions and
controls aimed at protecting the obligations due them and
will permit limited creditor involvement in the affairs of
their debtors.' 43 However, if a creditor uses its superior posi-
tion to supercede management's control over a wide range of
the debtor's affairs and undertakes to direct the method in
which its debtor's business operations will be conducted, it
assumes the risk that its conduct will be judicially scruti-
nized.' 44 This distinction is as it should be, for in the final
analysis a creditor who has agreed to advance funds or make
credit available then undertakes to engage in the business of
finance, not in the business of manufacturing goods or pro-
viding services.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
142. See, e.g., Credit Managers Assoc. of S. Calif. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App.
3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975); A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 48 & 74-77.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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